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LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR POLLUTION
CLAIMS: AVOIDING A LITIGATION
WASTELAND*
Brooke Jackson**
Coverage for pollution claims under Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity ("CGL") insurance policies is a topic of considerable current interest
to corporate officers, risk managers, insurance companies and others.
Much has been written on the pertinent legal issues in recent months and
years.1
This discussion, hopefully, will be a little different. It does analyze
the legal issues and many of the cases, admittedly from a policyholder's
perspective. However, it is organized from the viewpoint of a litigator
preparing and trying a case. And it is written by a litigator who believes
* Copyright @ 1990 by Brooke Jackson. The author thanks Camron R. Kuelthau, Jay S.
Jester, and Rosalee L. Rodda of Holland & Hart who contributed research and ideas for many parts
of this article.
** Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; A.B. Dartmouth College, J.D. Harvard Law School.
1. See, e.g., T. Milch, "Insurance Coverage for Environmental Claims: Some Key Coverage
Issues," presented at the Joint Program of the Commercial Torts Committee, Economics of Law
Practice Committee, Environmental Law Committee of the Litigation Section, and the Property
Law Committee, ABA Annual Meeting (August 8, 1990); J. O'Leary, Jr., "Current Trends in CGL
Insurance Coverage for Environmental Claims: An Introduction to Some Key Coverage Issues,"
id.; E. Anderson and J. Fried, "Insurance Claims for Environmental Damages," Insurance Claims
for Environmental Damages Conference, Executive Enterprises, Inc. (April 17, 1990); T. Brunner
and G. Cellucci, "Challenges for the Creative Defense Lawyer: Legal Issues in the 1990's," Mid-
Year Meeting of the Committee on Insurance Coverage Litigation, ABA Section of Litigation (April
7, 1990); Comment, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage for CERCLA Liabilities:
A Recommendation for Judicial Adherence to State Canons of Insurance Contract Construction, 61 U.
COLO. L.REv. 407 (1990); Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Litigation Institute, Prentice Hall Law
& Business (1989); Bradbury, Original Intent, Revisionism, and the Meaning of the CGL Policies, I
ENVT'L. CLAIMS J. 279 (1989); A. Rudlin, LIABILITY FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTAMINATION
AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CLAIMS, Defense Research Institute Seminar (Sep. 22,
1988); Pendygraft, Plews, Clark & Wright, Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Develop-
ments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L.REv. 117 (1988); E. An-
derson and M. Lupi, Environmental Risk Insurance: You CAN Count On It, Risk Management 68
(Oct. 1987); D. Jernberg and M. Furse, Environmental Risk Insurance: Don't Count On It, Risk
Management 42 (July 1987); Sayler & Zolensky, Pollution Coverages and the Intent of the CGL
Drafters" The Effect of Living Backwards, Mealey's Litigation Reports-Insurance 4425 (1987);
Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1986).
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that an incredible amount of time and money is being wasted in such
litigation, to the benefit of the lawyers but not necessarily the policyhold-
ers, insurers or the environment.
I. GETING STARTED: THRESHOLD ISSUES TO RESOLVE EARLY.
The scenario that gives rise to this paper involves an environmental
problem, typically a hazardous waste disposal situation of some kind,
which causes an environmental regulatory agency to demand that it be
investigated and cleaned up. Where any type of third-party property
damage is involved, such as groundwater contamination, the party re-
sponsible for the clean-up is likely to s6ek a defense and indemnification
from its liability insurers.
Among the many defenses that liability insurers raise, there are two
that present purely legal, but potentially dispositive, issues. First, where
the underlying claim by the environmental agency has not taken the form
of a formal lawsuit, insurers frequently take the position that there is no
duty to defend until a "suit" is filed in a court against the policyholder.
Second, the insurers always assert that where the agency seeks to compel
policyholders to clean up polluted sites, or to recover "response costs"
incurred by the agency itself in cleaning up the site, such claims are equi-
table in nature, not claims for "damages" which is what liability policies
cover.
Policyholders should consider bringing these issues to a head early.
The best way to do this, in the author's opinion, is by a summary judg-
ment motion in a declaratory judgment suit, regardless whether the suit
is filed by the policyholder or the insurer. If you are in a federal court,
you should consider a motion to certify the issue(s) to the state supreme
court. There is no reason to subject yourself to expensive, voluminous
discovery if the court is going to knock you out of the saddle on a purely
legal issue. Besides, there is an adequate body of case law now, mostly
pro-policyholder, to allow a relatively simple and easy presentation of
these issues.
To put them in context, a slight diversion into a simplified discus-
sion of the underlying claim is necessary.
A. CERCLA and its Relatives.
Hazardous waste problems that may be covered by insurance can
[Vol. 26:209
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arise in a variety of ways such as claims asserted by governmental agen-
cies, private party lawsuits, or discovery by the insured that it has a pol-
lution problem. Probably the most common scenario commences when
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") asserts a claim under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 ("CERCLA").2 The claim seeks to impose liability for the
investigation and clean-up of a contaminated site upon all parties deemed
responsible by the Act.
The EPA is authorized to remove, or arranqe for the removal of,
hazardous substances; and to provide for remedial action.3 Collectively,
costs of removals and remedial actions are "response costs."4 Any "re-
sponsible party," which is a broadly defined term, is liable for the re-
sponse costs.5 A responsible party is also liable for "damages for injury
to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources." 6
Note, the EPA has several options. It can conduct removals and
remedial actions through contractors it hires.7 In that scenario, the EPA
pays the costs directly out of the "Superfund" and sues the responsible
parties for repayment of such costs. 8 Alternatively, the EPA can sue but
simultaneously file a consent decree which resolves the suit by ordering
the responsible party to investigate and remediate the site. The EPA can
also issue administrative clean-up orders." The term "response costs"
includes all of these actions.
In addition, "trustees" of natural resources, i.e., the federal or state
agency charged with their management, can sue for natural resource
"damages." 10  "Damages" is defined tautologically to mean "damages
for injury or loss of natural resources as set forth in Section 9607 (a) or
9611 (b) of this title."1 The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has held that "restoration or replacement"
value is presumptively the appropriate measure of such damages. 2
2. Also known as "Superfund," 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq.(West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
4. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(25), 9604(a) (1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (1-4) (A),(B) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1-4) (C) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604 (a) (1) (A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
8. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607 (a), 9611(a), (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 (a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (a), (f) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (6) (1988).
12. State of Ohio v. United States Dept. of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Regu-
lations formerly prescribing the lesser of restoration costs or diminution in use value, 43 C.F.R.
§ 11.84 (g) (1) (1989), were struck down.
1990]
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These claims are typically commenced when the EPA sends the pol-
icyholder a request for information about a site under investigation pur-
suant to its authority under CERCLA § 104.' Eventually, the EPA will
notify the policyholder that it has been designated a "potentially respon-
sible party" or "PRP." The EPA proceeds to attempt to negotiate an
agreement with the PRP's to investigate and clean up the site.
Most state-instigated pollution claims, whether brought directly
under a state program or pursuant to an EPA deference of its CERCLA
role to the state, are essentially similar.
B. Duty to Defend Only "'Suits"?
The standard primary liability policy provides that "the company
shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured."' 14
Does that mean that only if and when a court suit is fied does any duty
to defend arise?
The term "suit" is undefined. Some courts have held that EPA ad-
ministrative actions such as designating a policyholder a "potentially re-
sponsible party" in a letter are not suits."5 However, the clear majority of
the reported cases go the other way, holding that such actions are the
substantial equivalent of lawsuits and trigger a duty to defend. 6
13. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604 (e) (2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990),[a "104(e) letter"].
14. A sample standard CGL policy containing all policy references can be found at 1 G.
COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984).
15. See, eg., Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 231, 232-33 (W.D. Mich. 1989);
Dextrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 442-55 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
16. See, eg., Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206 (2d Cir.
1989), reh'g denied, 894 F.2d 498 (1990) (a "PRP letter" which demanded information and the
submission of a remedial action plan under threat of monetary penalties, waiver of defense and suit
for non-compliance was "sufficiently adversarial to constitute a suit under New York law and within
the meaning of the policy"; a letter merely inviting voluntary action might not have amounted to a
"suit"); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C86-352WD, slip op. at 20-24 (W.D. Wash.
April 16, 1990), [reported in Mealey's Litigation Reports - Insurance, April 24, 1990, at App. B (a
"suit" is "the attempt to gain an end by legal process") (quoting Webster's Third New World Inter-
national Dictionary 1976); a PRP letter qualifies]; Higgins Indus. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 730 F.
Supp. 774,776-79 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 407
Mass. 689, 693-97, 555 N.E.2d 576, 579-82 (1990)(EPA letter demanding implementation of all
necessary remedial measures and reimbursing EPA's costs on a "voluntary" basis and requesting
information but with possible criminal penalties for non-compliance was substantially equivalent to a
lawsuit); C. D. Spangler Const. Co. v. Indus. Crankshaft and Eng. Co., 326 N.C. 133,-, 388 S.E.2d
557, 569-70 (1990), ("suit" has different meanings; state compliance orders qualify); Polkow v. Citi-
zens Ins. Co. of Am., 180 Mich. Ct. App. 651, -, 447 N.W. 2d 853, 855-56 (1989). Earlier similar
decisions are Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987 ) and
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levelor Lorentzen, Inc., No. 88-1994, slip op. at 6 n.2, 1988 WL
112142, 57 U.S.L.W. 2270 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 1988), appeal dismissed, 879 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1989).
See also, Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co., No. 90-1217, slip op. at 10-29 (1st Cir. Sept. 27, 1990) (governmen-
tal administrative actions are "suits" if they have a sufficiently adversarial or coercive quality; a
4
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If the issue can be viewed as a "policy matter," the correct answer
seems clear. Potentially responsible parties regularly establish a primary
goal of maintaining control over the investigation and clean up at the
site. The general perception is that if the EPA or state agency conducts
the investigation and clean up, the costs inevitably escalate, often in mul-
tiples, compared to the costs if the PRP does the work pursuant to an
administrative order or consent decree. The policyholder and its insurer
have strong economic motives for avoiding formal litigation. The agen-
cies ordinarily are willing to forego formal litigation so long as they can
obtain adequate response on an administrative level. It would be an ab-
surd result, from the perspective of the policyholder, the insurer and the
public, for policyholders to have to stonewall and force suits to be filed in
order to trigger coverage.
What if a court decides that "suit" means exclusively a court.suit,
and the EPA never does file such a suit? There is no duty to defend, but
there still is an obligation to indemnify against all sums the policyholder
becomes obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or prop-
erty damage. Insurers can argue that the policyholder cannot become
legally obligated to pay damages if there is no suit. However, having de-
clined to defend, the insurer is in a poor position to reject indemnity on
the ground that the policyholder settled in response to an administrative
proceeding or order.
In fact, a legal obligation to pay damages has been held to arise even
in the absence of any claim, administrative proceeding or judicial deter-
mination. 17 Polluters inevitably will be called to task. Delay in respond-
ing is both economically and socially undesirable. That does not mean
that insurance contracts may be re-written. However, if a policyholder
accidentally causes pollution damage and wishes to repair the damage
before being formally forced to do so, its right to indemnification should
not be forfeited by a technical construction of "legally obligated to pay"
request to submit plans for any proposed remedial action which did not, however, demand clean-up
or reimbursement did not qualify).
17. Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargen & Co., 748 P.2d 724, 728 (Wyo. 1988) (CGL policy
covered the cost of cleaning up damage to an adjacent property caused by an oil spill on the insured's
property even though it was cleaned up before any claim was asserted, because a Wyoming statute
required the clean-up); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 178 Mich. Ct. App. 706, 444
N.W.2d 813, 819 (1989) ("[I]t makes no difference that Upjohn took the remedial action it did
before being ordered to do so and, in fact, we believe that such swift remedial action should be
encouraged rather than discouraged." (Citations omitted)). But see Gelman Sciences, Inc. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Cos., Nos. 111722, 112825, 114207 (Mich. Ct. App. April 17, 1990) [reported in
Mealey' s Litigation Reports - Insurance, April 24, 1990, at 7].
1990]
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or "damages." Such costs, even though "voluntarily" incurred, should
be eligible for coverage.
Interestingly, the new "Commercial General Liability Coverage
Form" which went into use in 1986 defines "suit" to mean any "civil
proceeding" in which damages "are alleged."18 It expressly includes arbi-
tration proceedings.19 If anything, that suggests that the undefined term
"suit" in the previous form was not unequivocally confined to formal
complaints filed in a court.
C. The "as damagaes" Argument.
The pertinent language from the coverage part of the standard pol-
icy reads:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damaqes because of
bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies,
caused by an occurrence.20
If the insurer's argument that EPA or state claims for "cost recov-
ery" of "response costs" do not seek "damages" is accepted, summary
judgment will be entered for the insurer on both duty to defend and duty
to indemnify. This makes the "as damages" issue very popular.
1. The Cases.
There are literally dozens of cases from various state and federal
courts with mixed results on this question. The overwhelming majority
favors the policyholders.2"
Washington was the first state supreme court to hold that costs in-
curred in cleaning up toxic waste pursuant to state cleanup orders are
"damages;" North Carolina, Minnesota and Massachusetts have since
agreed.22 Maine is contrary.23 Several other state supreme courts have
the issue before them -California, Iowa, New Jersey, New York and
18. See 1 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869,-, 784 P.2d 507,
511, 522 (1990) (calculating it at fifty-six to fifty-seven for the insureds at that time).
22. Id.; C. D. Spangler Const. Co. v. Indus. Crankshaft and Eng. Co., Inc., 326 N.C. 133, -,
388 S.E.2d 557, 565-69 (1990); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457
N.W.2d 175, 178-84 (Minn. 1990); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 407
Mass. 689, 698-702, 555 N.E.2d 576, 582-84 (1990).
23. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 18-19 (Me. 1990).
[Vol. 26:209
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West Virginia.24 The federal appellate courts are divided.2 5 Numerous
federal district courts have joined the majority of state courts on this
issue.26
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in both
NEPA CCO and Armco and, since state law issues are involved, it is ques-
tionable whether there will be any resolution at that level.
2. Analysis I: Equitable Damages.
Many courts favoring policyholders seem to accept the proposition
that response costs under CERCLA are restitutionary and therefore an
equitable remedy. However, they reason that the term "damages" in the
liability policy, which is undefined, must be given its ordinary meaning,
not a technical legal meaning dependent upon historic differences within
the legal system between actions in equity and actions at law.27 The in-
sured is being forced to pay money to remedy property damage. The
plain, ordinary meaning of "damages" as defined in dictionaries, and per-
ceived by the layman, includes such costs. At a minimum, the term
"damages" is ambiguous and must be construed against the insurer.21 If
the draftsmen of the policies wanted to provide that only remedies at law
were covered, they could have done so.
24. See BusINEss INsuRANCE, Feb. 19, 1990 at 1; Mealey's Litigation Reports - Insurance,
July 25, 1989.
25. The Second Circuit in Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206-
07 (2d Cir. 1989) reh'g denied, 894 F.2d 498 (2d. Cir. 1990), became the first federal appellate court
squarely to counter the two oft-cited favorites of the insurers: Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 66 (1988)(the
"NEPACCO" case) and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 489 U.S. 1008 (1988). See also Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d
1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1986) (predicting that the Oregon Supreme Court would hold that discharge of
pollution into water causes property damage such that cleanup costs are recoverable under a prop-
erty damage liability clause). NEPACCO and Armco have been criticized even within the Fourth
and Eighth Circuits. See, eg., Chesapeake Utilities Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F.
Supp. 551, 558-61 (D. Del. 1989) (refusing to follow Armco because it "misstates Maryland law");
Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Ins. Co., No. 88-5723 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1989) [reported in Mealey's
Litigation Reports - Insurance, May 23, 1989, at 3 (rejecting NEPACCO's interpretation of Mis-
souri law because the court "ignored clear signals emanating from the state courts or clearly misread
state law")].
26. Good lists of the many decisions can be found in C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Indus.
Crankshaft and Eng. Co., 326 N.C. 133, -, 388 S.E.2d 557, 564-65 n.9 (1990); Minnesota Mining
and Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 180-181 nn. 5 and 6 (Minn. 1990), and
Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1188 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
27. See, eg., Spangler, supra note 22, 388 S.E.2d at 566-69; Boeing, supra note 21, 784 P.2d at
510-12.
28. See, eg., Minnesota Mining, supra note 26, 457 N.W.2d at 179-81.
1990]
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3. Analysis II: Response Costs Are Legal Damages.
Response costs include costs of removal, remedial action and en-
forcement activities related thereto.2 9 These include the cost of investi-
gating the problem and repairing the damage, plus ancillary EPA
oversight and other administrative charges. There is obvious overlap be-
tween the remedy EPA can seek under the label "response costs" and
that which it can seek under the label "damages." Regardless of the ave-
nue chosen, repair costs should properly be classified as "damages" in
even the technical legal sense.
Although CERCLA imposes statutory strict liability, analogies to
ordinary common law negligence cases illustrate the point. Example 1:
A car is damaged in an automobile accident. The owner's measure of
damage is either the cost of repair (determined by the body shop's in-
voice) or replacement (if the car was totaled); the latter is ordinarily de-
termined on a diminution in market value theory, i.e., the difference
between the fair market value of the car before the accident and its as-is
value (scrap value or zero). Example 2: Property is flooded after the
neighbor's development changes the run-off pattern during storms. The
landowner's measure of damages is either cost of repair or diminution in
market value. Ordinarily, repair costs may not exceed before-injury
value; but if the damaged property is uniquely important to the plaintiff,
or he has no choice but to restore it to its original condition, courts may
in their discretion permit recovery of the cost of repair even where it
exceeds the value of the damaged property.30 The critical point is that
these types of cases are submitted to juries every day in courts through-
out the country. This suggests that cost of repair is a recognized measure
of legal damages.3"
Claims brought under CERCLA are analytically no different. The
EPA seeks to recover the costs of repairing the public's property (such as
groundwater, air or other natural resources). The costs of repair are mea-
sured by the invoices of the contractors who investigate and clean up the
damaged property. If the property cannot be fully repaired, the public
trustee can seek additional compensation for the loss of a natural re-
source, i.e., diminution in value. Whether the EPA commissions the in-
vestigation and clean-up, or the PRP does so pursuant to an EPA order
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (25) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
30. See, e.g., Heninger v. Dunn, 101 Cal. App. 3d 858, -, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 106-09 (1980);
Board of County Cornm'rs of County of Weld v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1313-1316 (Colo. 1986);
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or a consent decree, makes no more difference than whether a body shop
that repairs a car is hired and directly paid by the plaintiff or by the
defendant. Either way, the responsible party sustains a monetary loss.
This is precisely the type of problem that liability insurance is purchased
for in the first place.
Ultimately, efforts to analyze response costs as equitable versus legal
depend upon theoretical and abstract notions that are difficult to explain
or justify. It is no surprise that most courts do not feel compelled to
interpret standard liability policies on this basis.
II. THE CORE ISSUES.
A. Occurrence.
The principal coverage-part issue is whether the bodily injury or
property damage was caused by an "occurrence." An occurrence is de-
fined in the standard form (1973 revision) as:
an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured.32
In pre-1966 policies, the term "accident" was used instead of "oc-
currence," but judicial interpretation of the term "accident" gave it sub-
stantially the same meaning as the more modern "occurrence".
The new form which went into use in 1986 is offered in alternative
"occurrence" and "claims made" versions. 34 The claims made form
changes the "trigger" analysis in some obvious, but complicated, ways
that are beyond the scope of this article. This form has received relatively
little market acceptance to date, and it is still in a state of flux due to
reactions from the market. In any event, claims arising from environ-
mental damage occurring before the new form came into being will wage
on through the 1990's, and these claims are the subject of this article.
1. When Does an Occurrence (or Accident) Occur: The
"Trigger" Issue.
The question of when bodily injury or property damage occurs can
be complicated and difficult as a matter of fact. In Coordinated Asbestos
32. 1 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984).
33. 37. See, eg., Beryllium Corp. v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 223 F.2d 71 (3d Cir.
1955); Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 411 Ill. 325, -, 104
N.E.2d 250 (1952).
34. 1 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984).
1990]
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Insurance Coverage Cases, 5 Judge Brown's lengthy legal analysis regard-
ing when bodily injury occurs from asbestos exposure illustrates this.3 6
Judge Brown also struggled with the factual trigger concerning property
damage claims.37
As a matter of law, however, the question is simply and clearly an-
swered on the face of the policy. "Bodily injury" means bodily injury,
sickness or disease "which occurs during the policy period."3 "Property
damage" means physical injury to or destruction of tangible property (or
loss of use of such property) which occurs "during the policy period."'39
An "occurrence" is an event "which results in bodily injury or property
damage."'  Plainly, the timing of an occurrence depends solely on when
the bodily injury or property damage occurred.
Thus, if bodily injury or property damage occurs during the term of
the policy, the policy is "triggered." As is thoroughly discussed in the
Coordinated Asbestos opinions,41 it was clearly intended by the drafts-
men, and is clear also from the policy language, that when injury or dam-
age occurs over time and overlaps more than one policy, each such policy
is triggered. It is important to recognize that the question of which poli-
cies are triggered is distinct from the matter of "stacking" of coverages.
This should not be a disputed issue in most cases. Fair-minded parties
and competent counsel should be able to stipulate on the legal definition
of the "trigger" of coverage.
Other theories such as (a) the date the waste was disposed of,42 (b)
the date the environmental injury is discovered or "manifests" itself,43
and (c) the date of the victim's "exposure" to asbestos while inhaling it
on the job, but not while the disease progresses after the inhalation
stops,44 are simply contrary to the plain language of the policy. Many of
35. Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceedings No. 1072
(Cal. Super. Ct.); see infra notes 36, 37, 41, 47, 48, 59, 105 citing the various phases.
36. Tentative Decision Concerning Phase III Issues 12-57 (Calif. Super. Ct., May 29, 1987).
37. Statement of Decision Concerning Phase V-A Issues, released in draft form Dec. 13, 1989
(withdrawing Judge Brown's Tentative Aug. 29, 1988 ruling that asbestos property damage triggers
insurance coverage continuously from the time asbestos is installed until it is removed or a claim is
filed and substituting a final ruling that insurance coverage is triggered when the asbestos-containing
products are installed, when they are in fact released, and when settled releases are disturbed and
reentrained into the air).
38. 1 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Supra note 35 and corresponding text.
42. See, eg., Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180
(8th Cir. 1987), rev'd en banc, 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988).
43. See, ag., Mraz v. Canadian Univ. Ins. Co. Ltd., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
44. E.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1981).
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these cases were born from the efforts of a policyholder to adapt his best
coverage year or policy to some triggering fact other than the date when
the injury or damage itself occurred, to maximize coverage. Just as fre-
quently, the cases reflect the desire of an insurer, exposed under the cor-
rect trigger theory, to point the finger at another insurer or the
policyholder (in an uninsured period), or at least to gain more partners to
share the loss. Sometimes risk managers hear two different theories from
insurers, who say they are mutually exclusive, and believe one more than
the other - not realizing that multiple insurers' policies may be trig-
gered. In short, greed has spawned some poor decisions in this area.
Of course, the new claims-made form radically changes (and con-
fuses) the trigger; but, so far, few of the liability policies sold are of this
type. The new "occurrence" form is substantially identical to the old one
on the trigger concept.
2. "Expected or Intended": Subjective or Objective Standard?
A more interesting question is whether the term "neither expected
nor intended" is to be applied using an objective or subjective standard.
"Objective" means whether a reasonable insured in the same or similar
circumstances would have expected or intended that bodily injury or
property damage would result from his act. A "subjective" approach
asks whether this particular insured expected or intended the injury or
damage in question. This can potentially make a big difference before a
jury. In today's society, we are all much more environmentally aware
than in earlier decades; with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to say that
a policyholder should have realized that what he was doing would ulti-
mately cause damage or injury. However, when a subjective standard is
used, the trial becomes a credibility contest: did the men and women
running the company actually expect to cause third-party damage or
injury?
The plain language of the policy, "neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured,"45 focuses on the actual, subjective
expectations and intentions of the insured. It requires the fact-finder to
view the events as the insured viewed them, adopting the insured's per-
spective and outlook to determine the insured's motivations. Asking
what another person similarly situated might have expected or intended
would ignore the phrase "from the standpoint of the insured."46
45. See I G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
46. The highest courts of numerous states have adopted a subjective standard in construing this
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The drafting history of the occurrence definition, which can be de-
veloped through documents available in discovery, confirms the intent to
use a subjective standard to determine what the insured expected and
intended.47 For example, in connection with the 1966 CGL policy revi-
sions, an exclusion was proposed which provided:
This policy does not apply to bodily injury or property damage result-
ing from deliberate acts or omissions of the insured which with reason-
able certainty may be expected to produce injury or damage.48
The proposal was rejected because, although the drafters meant to ex-
clude coverage for "intentional results of intentional act[s], such as mur-
der.. .," they did not mean to exclude coverage simply because damage
was "foreseeable."
49
In 1978, there was a proposal to exclude bodily injury or property
damage either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured,
or substantially certain to occur as a result of an intended act or omission
by the insured. The apparent intent was to eliminate the subjective stan-
dard and substitute an objective one, but the proposal was never adopted.
In fact, the new form adopted in 1986 continues to use the "from the
standpoint of the insured" language.50
A closely related question at the heart of liability insurance is
whether injury foreseeably resulting from an intentional act is covered or
excluded. To make out a prima facie case in tort, such as negligence, a
victim must prove that his or her injury was foreseeable to the defendant.
language. Breland v. Schilling, 550 So.2d 609, 611-613 (La. 1989); United States Fidelity and Guar.
Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. 1985); Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426
A.2d 888, 892 (Me. 1981); Northwestern Nat. Casualty Co. v. Phalen, 597 P.2d 720, 725-726 (Mont.
1979); Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Toal, 309 Minn. 169,-, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125-26 (1976). See
also Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash.2d 381, -, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (1986); Talley v. MFA Mut.
Ins. Co., 273 Ark. 269, -, 620 S.W.2d 260, 262-63 (1981); Nielsen v. St. Paul Cos., 283 Or. 277, -,
583 P.2d 545, 547-48 (1978); Mohn v. American Casualty Co. of Readinq, 458 Pa. 576, -, 326 A.2d
346, 348 (1974); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Muth, 190 Neb. 248, -, 207 N.W.2d 364, 366
(1973). So have many other courts. See, e.g., City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877
F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (2d Cir. 1989): Health Care & Retirement Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 621 F. Supp. 155, 161 (S.D. W.Va. 1985); Lansco, Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J.
Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520, 523-524 (1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (1976), cert.
denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
47. See Coordinated Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases: Tentative Decision Concerninq Phase III
Issues, No. 1072 (May 29, 1987) at 74.
48. Testimony of H. P. Schoen, Associate General Counsel, Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co., given in Coordinated Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, depo. 15901.
49. Id.
50. Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, Section I.A.2.a. (Form CG 00 01 11 85,
Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1982, 1984).
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It would be anomalous if that very proof were to nullify the defendant's
insurance. Logically, it cannot.
There is a presumption in tort law that a person intends the natural
and probable consequences of his intentional acts. However, this pre-
sumption has no application in the interpretation of the terms used in
the "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured"
coverage clause and the policy term "expected or intended injury" can-
not be equated with foreseeable injury.
Indeed, the draftsmen of the standard CGL policy intended that it would
provide coverage for the unintended results of intentional acts. 2
This fundamental understanding of liability insurance must be ap-
plied whether dealing with exclusionary language within the occurrence
definition (which is in the coverage grant) or listed exclusions from cov-
erage. Thus, per a federal district judge in New Jersey,
an insurance policy exclusion for manufacturing activities which carry
a risk of causing environmental harm, although not known or intended
to cause harm... would indeed create an exclusion swallowing the
entire purpose of insurance protection for unintended consequences.
Insurance is purchased and premiums are paid to indemnify the in-
sured for damages caused by accidents, that is, for conduct not meant
to cause harm but which goes awry .... If the policy holder were to be
told that the words... excluding coverage for "expected or intended"
damages actually mean that coverage is also lost for damage which a
prudent person "should have" foreseen, there would be no point to
purchasing a policy of liability insurance.53
In Broderick Investment Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co., the court instructed the jury as follows:
For purposes of this determination [whether the policyholder expected
or intended to cause damage], it does not matter what another person
might have expected or intended in similar circumstances. You must
decide what plaintiffs actually expected or intended. One cannot, how-
ever, avoid the consequences of conduct from being expected or in-
tended merely by choosing to ignore that which is obvious.55
51. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. 1985), quot-
ing Alabama Farm Mut. Casualty Ins. v. Dyer, 454 So.2d 921, 925 (Ala. 1984). See Hutchinson
Water Co., Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 250 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1957).
52. See Heinz, Gallozzi and Gills, Interpretinq the Scope of Coverage for Unexpected Results, 2
ENvrL LJ. 377, 378-79 (1990).
53. J. T. Baker, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 86-4794, slip op. at 13-14 (D.N.J. Feb.
14, 1989).
54. Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. 86-Z-1033 (D. Colo.), tried to a
jury October 16-27, 1989.
55. Id., Jury Instruction No. 13.
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Similarly, in Boeing, the court ruled that "intended" meant "the in-
sured wanted the damages to result," and "expected" meant "the insured
knew that there was a high degree of probability or a substantial cer-
tainty that damage would result from its act;" it turns on the insured's
state of mind, which is a jury issue. 6
The insurance industry today wants to avoid its own policy lan-
guage and take refuge in tort concepts; however, if the contract itself is
not conclusive, the drafting history and the very purpose of liability in-
surance should be.
3. Burden of Proof.
Traditionally, policyholders have the burden to prove coverage,5 7
whereas the insurer has the burden to prove an exclusion. 8 Thus, deal-
ing with the phrase, "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured", becomes an important question.
Although this phrase is part of the definition of "occurrence," it is
written in exclusionary-type language. The "neither expected nor in-
tended" language is simply the more modern version of the traditional
exclusion of intentional torts such as assault and battery . Numerous
courts 9 have held it constitutes an exclusion, notwithstanding its loca-
tion in the policy, because it has the effect of limiting coverage.
In the new (1986) standard CGL form, this "exclusion" is returned
to the exclusion section; the first exclusion is of bodily injury or property
damage expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. In fact,
the 1966 drafters initially had it in "exclusion (a)" but moved it for "mer-
chandizing reasons," according to drafting history documents.6 0
In Broderick Investment Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,
the court instructed the jury as follows:
56. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 784 P.2d 507 (1990).
57. State v. National Auto Ins. Co., 290 A.2d 675, 678 (Del. Ch. 1972).
58. West v. Credit Life Ins. Co., 30 Colo. App. 455, -, 494 P.2d 601, 602 (1972).
59. See, e'g., Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714,720 (8th Cir. 1981); Clemco Indus.
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 665 F.Supp. 816, 820 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 1242 (9th
Cir. 1988); J.T. Baker, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 86-4794, slip op. at 10 (D.N.J. Feb.
14, 1989); Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau, 113 Wash. 2d 91, -, 776 P.2d 123, 126, 130-31 (1989);
Woida v. North Star Mut. Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 570, 572-73 (Minn. 1987); Coordinated Asbestos
Ins. Coverage Cases, Tentative Decision Concerning Phase III Issues 72-73 (Calif. Super. Ct., Judge
Brown, May 29, 1987) (purpose and function of "neither expected nor intended" clause is to limit
coverage, so it must be treated in the same manner as other exclusions). Contra Boeing Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C86-352WD (W.D. Wash. April 16, 1990), slip op. at 7, Mealey's, April
24, 1990, App. B.
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In order to establish that there is no coverage under its policies, de-
fendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that plaintiffs expected or intended property damage, i.e., that plaintiffs
expected or intended to contaminate groundwater or adjoining
property.61
There are documents obtainable from insurers' files which confirm
that the industry itself viewed the "neither expected nor intended" lan-
guage as an exclusion. These have been produced in some cases but gen-
erally pursuant to confidentiality agreements or protective orders.
In pollution cases, placing this burden on the policyholder would
create an anomaly. The pollution exclusion excludes coverage for pollu-
tion damage unless the damage is "sudden and accidental," which most
courts have interpreted to mean "unexpected and unintended." The in-
surer's burden of proving exclusions includes exceptions to exclusions.62
Plainly, an insured cannot be required to prove that damage was neither
expected nor intended while, in the same case, the insurer is required to
prove that the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape" of the pollutants
was expected or intended. The burden of proof for both terms must fall
on either the insured or the insurer.
B. The Pollution Exclusion.
1. History.
Before 1970 there was no pollution exclusion. The drafting history
of the 1966 form shows an intent to include unexpected pollution
losses.63 For example, in a speech promoting the new form, Gilbert Bean
of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, who participated in the drafting
process, commented that "[s]moke, fumes and other air or stream pollu-
tion have caused an endless chain of severe claims for gradual property
damage," and that
*.. if the injury or damage from waste disposal should continue after
the waste disposal ceased, as it usually does, it could produce losses on
each side of a renewal date, and in fact, over a period of years, with a
separate policy applying each year.
64
Beginning in about 1970, the now notorious exclusion of pollution
61. Broderick, supra note 54, Jury Instruction No. 13.
62. See, eg., Brammer v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 182 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1970); 19 G.
COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 79:385 (2d ed. 1983).
63. See Just v. Land Reclamation, Inc., 155 Wis. 2d 737, -, 456 N.W.2d 570, 574 (1990).
64. Address by Gilbert Bean, "New Comprehensive General and Automobile Program - the
Effect on Manufacturing Risks", Mutual Insurance Technical Conference (Nov. 15-16, 1965).
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not "sudden and accidental" was added to policies by endorsement; after
1973 or so, the standard CGL form included that exclusion within its
regular list. It provides that the insurance does not apply:
To bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dis-
persal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any
water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such
discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental. 65
In about 1983 or 1984, many carriers began to add a so-called "ab-
solute pollution exclusion" to their CGL policies by endorsement. The
new occurrence and claims-made forms implemented in 1986 contain the
absolute pollution exclusion. Thus, insureds can buy limited pollution
coverage by endorsement only at very substantial premiums. The "abso-
lute pollution exclusion" attempts to - and in most situations probably
does - exclude virtually all pollution-related claims, illustrating, inci-
dentally, that when the insurers wanted to do that, they knew how to do
it.66 CGL litigation in pollution cases, therefore, focuses upon bodily
injury or property damage occurring during the years before the absolute
exclusion was adopted.
2. Sudden and Accidental.
Most of the litigation and writing concerning the pollution exclusion
has focused on the phrase "sudden and accidental." Obviously, these
terms are extremely important. If "sudden" means temporally abrupt,
summary judgment will likely be granted to the insurer in a "gradual
pollution" case. If it means that unexpected and unintended pollution
damage is covered, but intentional pollution damage is not, i.e., a restate-
ment or clarification of the occurrence standard, then whether the pollu-
tion exclusion bars coverage will turn on the jury's or court's resolution
of that issue as a matter of fact.
It has been suggested that only a "lawyer's ingenuity" could find
65. See I G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984).
66. See, e-g., Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., No. 89-55082, slip op. at 7-8 (9th
Cir. July 13, 1990), Mealey's Litigation Reports - Insurance, July 31, 1990, at 6-7 and App. F(although "[s]tandard pollution exclusions are routinely deemed ambiguous and rejected by the
courts," the California Supreme Court would probably find the absolute exclusion to be an unambig-
uous exclusion of coverage); Time Oil Co. v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Ins. Co., No. C88-1235R
(W.D. Wash. April 2, 1990), [reported in Mealey's Litigation Reports, April 10, 1990, at 11-13
(contrasting "absolute pollution exclusion" with the "qualified pollution exclusion")].
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ambiguity in the pollution exclusion.67 This is an exaggerated compli-
ment to the legal profession. To begin with, some very illuminating
drafting history evidence is available which shows what the draftsmen
intended when the pollution exclusion was adopted in the early 1970's,
and what was represented to state regulators at that time. Much of it is
collected, and persuasively discussed, in the notorious brief filed in the
Michigan Court of Appeals by, among others, the First State Insurance
Company (a Hartford subsidiary).6" The Upjohn brief draws the follow-
ing conclusions from contemporaneous intent evidence appended to the
brief-
[T]he [pollution] exclusion was designed to simply reinforce the fact
that damages expected or intended on the part of the insured are not
covered under the policy... Public representations made to state in-
surance authorities across the country prior to the adoption of the pol-
lution exclusion indicate that the "sudden and accidental" requirement
for coverage set forth in the pollution exclusion was not intended as an
additional hurdle to recovery if the incident fell within the "occur-
rence" definition of "unexpected" and "unintended." . .. [T]he in-
tended meaning of "sudden" as used in the exception to the pollution
exclusion is "unexpected" and... "sudden and accidental" is nothing
more nor less than a restatement of the requirement of the occurrence
definition that events be "unexpected and unintended." 69
Or, consider these observations in a letter from Thomas A. Jackson
of The Travelers Insurance Company:7'
In your letter of December 11 th, you raised several objections; the
most striking was the third which implied that the term "sudden and
accidental" as used in Sections 46(3) and 46(14) of the New York In-
surance Law prohibited covering gradual pollution incidents.
Is your opinion based upon legal interpretation of these sections or
court decisions, or is it the prevailing opinion of the Department?
"Sudden and accidental" as a term standing by itself is capable of
many interpretations.
The word "sudden" in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary is defined
as:
1 a: happening or coming unexpectedly
b: changing angle or character all at once
2 : marked by or manifesting abruptness or haste
67. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F.Supp. 1420, 1429 (D. Kan.
1987).
68. Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., No. 98969 (Mich. Ct. App. filed Nov. 6, 1987).
69. Id. at 23-27.
70. Letter from Thomas A. Jackson, Secretary, Casualty-Property Commercial Lines Depart-
ment, The Travelers Insurance Company, to the New York Insurance Department (Jan. 13, 1982).
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3 : made or brought about in a short time
The word "accidental: [sic] is similarly defined as:
1 : arising from extrinsic causes
2 a: occurring unexpectedly or
b: happening without intent or through carelessness and often
with unfortunate results
There is nothing in the term "sudden and accidental" which requires
the elimination of gradually occurring events from the collective.
A number of court decisions in many jurisdictions have essentially
reached the same conclusion: there is nothing which prevents gradu-
ally occurring events from being considered to be "sudden and acci-
dental" as long as there is no intent to cause injury or damages.
The New York law is sensibly applied only when it is interpreted to
mean that deliberate polluters cannot be insured.
When it is interpreted to mean that unexpected or unintended gradual
pollution may not be insured, it will deprive insureds and claimants of
protection which should be available and which the insurance industry
is willing to provide.
How, rationally, can the law be interpreted to prevent insurance for
"non-sudden" or gradually occurring pollution liabilities created by
accidental, unexpected or unintended actions?7 1
The drafter apparently found the "sudden and accidental" clause in
earlier boiler and machine policies,72 whereunder the term "sudden" had
been interpreted to mean unforeseen or unexpected. 73 In any event, sev-
eral courts have now discussed the evidence in depth before coming to
the conclusion that only expected or intended pollution was meant to be
excluded.7 4
The meaning of the pollution exclusion likely would never have been
questioned if the environmental situation had not changed radically from
the time when the standard language was adopted. It has been suggested
71. Id.
72. Deposition of Richard Schmaltz, General Counsel of The Hartford, cited in Memorandum
in Support of Plaintiff The Boeing Company's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the So-
Called "Pollution Exclusion," at 12 n. 7, Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C86-352WD
(W.D. Wash.), filed February 8, 1990.
73. See, ag., Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 53 Wash. 2d
404, -, 333 P.2d 938, 940 (1959). See also 10A G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 42:396 (2d
ed. 1982).
74. Just v. Land Reclamation, Inc., 155 Wis.2d 737,-, 456 N.W.2d 570, 574-75 (1990); Claus-
sen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, -, 380 S.E. 2d 686, 689 (1989); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 IlL. App.3d 378, -, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1077
(1989), appeal denied, 136 Ill. D C. 609, 545 N.E. 2d 133 (1989); Kipin Industries, Inc. v. American
Universal Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, -, 535 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1987) . See Anderson and
Passannante, Insurance Industry Doublethink The Real and Revisionist Meaninqs of "Sudden and
Accidental", 12 INS. Lrr. REP. 186 (1990).
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that the marketing efforts in the early 1970's were based on misrepresen-
tations.7" This author disagrees. The drafting history shows that unex-
pected and unintended pollution damage was genuinely intended to be
covered. However, in the early 1970's and even into the early 1980's, the
enormous CERCLA claims that are commonplace today were not con-
templated. It is this economic fact change that has caused the industry
and its lawyers to reinterpret the policy language.
However, extrinsic evidence is unnecessary. The undefined term
"sudden" is ambiguous on the face of the policy for at least two reasons.
First, "sudden" is defined in most dictionaries in both ways. For exam-
ple, Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "sudden" as:
Happening without previous notice or with very brief notice: coming
or occurring unexpectedly: not foreseen or prepared for; b: changing
angle or character all at once: precipitous: abrupt... 76
Second, there is an inherent inconsistency between the "temporally
abrupt" definition and the recognition in the definition of "occurrence"
that an "accident" includes continuous or repeated exposure to condi-
tions, i.e., gradual events. How can something be both "sudden" (tempo-
rally abrupt) and "accidental" (including gradual events)? That
inconsistency creates an ambiguity.77 In Chevron,7" Judge Carrigan de-
clined to apply automatically the familiar maxim that an ambiguity in an
insurance policy must be construed against the draftsman and in favor of
coverage, because there was evidence of the specific intent of the insurer
and the insured regarding the inclusion of the pollution exclusion in a
manuscript policy. Because of this unique circumstance, the court indi-
cated that it would require an evidentiary hearing on that intent before
construing the ambiguous term.79 Absent that circumstance, an ambigu-
ity within a term, or one created by conflict with another part of the
policy, should be construed in favor of the insured under the applicable
75. See, eg., Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1572-73 (S.D. Ga.
1987), reversed, 888 F.2d 747 (11th Cir. 1989) (the district court found that insurance industry
representations to the Georgia Insurance Department in 1970 were dishonest but nevertheless inter-
preted "sudden" as connoting abruptness. The eleventh circuit reversed after certifying the question
to the Georgia Supreme Court and receiving the answer that "sudden and accidental" means "unex-
pected and unintended").
76. WEBsTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1971).
77. Time Oil Co. v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Co., No. C88-1235R, slip op. at 14-15 (W.D.
Wash. April 2, 1990); City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217, 222 (D. Colo.
1986).
78. Chevron, supra note 77.
79. Ia at 222-23.
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state's law.80
This paper is not intended to be another encyclopedia of the case
law, but it must be acknowledged that some courts have found "sudden
and accidental" to be unambiguous and have construed it to exclude
gradual, albeit unexpected and unintended, releases.81  However,
many-almost certainly the substantial majority-of the cases take the
position that "sudden" in this context means "unexpected" and has
nothing to do with the temporal characteristics of the event.8 2
Frankly, policyholders can bring problems upon themselves when
they disregard the reasoning of these cases. Occasionally a policyholder
was aware, when it purchased the insurance, that it was causing ground-
water contamination or other environmental damage yet, nevertheless,
pursues an insurance claim. Bad facts can breed bad law in the pollution
exclusion context as in any other.8 3 A policyholder which cannot legiti-
mately show (regardless who bears the burden of proof) that it was una-
ware of the third party damage when it purchased its policy, should not
pursue an insurance claim. If such a claim is brought, it should be de-
cided summarily in favor of the insurer without construing the pollution
exclusion in a manner that excludes proper claims.
3. What Must Be "Sudden and Accidental"?
A phrase that has not yet received much attention is "discharge,
dispersal, release, or escape." Its interpretation can be critical. For ex-
ample, even if "sudden and accidental" is interpreted to mean "unex-
pected and unintended," the insured often admits that it expected and
intended the discharge of pollutants in the first instance. Using the exam-
ple of waste chemicals in holding ponds, the insured clearly expected and
intended to discharge its hazardous materials into the ponds; but it may
80. See, eg., Worsham Const. Co., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 687 P.2d 988, 990 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984); Colard v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
81. See, eg., Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E. 2d 374, 382
(N.C. 1986); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 693 F. Supp. 617, 621
(M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd, 875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1989); FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
897 F.2d 214, 218-20 (6th Cir. 1990).
82. See, eg., Benedictine Sisters v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1209, 1211 (8th
Cir. 1987); United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1156-
57 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1541, 1548-50 (S.D. Fla. 1987); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 673 F.
Supp. 1359, 1364 (D. Del. 1987); Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & In-
dem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 992-95 (N.J. Super. 1982).
83. See, eg., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1428-32
(D. Kan. 1987), appealpendinq, No. 88-1503 (10th Cir. 1990); compare Alcolac Inc. v. St. Paul Fire
and Marine Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1541, 1544-45 (D. Md. 1989).
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well not have expected or known that such materials would escape (seep)
from the ponds and contaminate underground water.
It must be remembered that the pollution exclusion is part of a lia-
bility insurance policy. Liability insurance protects the insured against
injury or damage it may cause to third persons. Viewed in this context,
the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape" logically must involve: a
third person's property (e.g., groundwater which belongs to the State or
the public under most states' laws); an adjoining property; or, actual in-
juries to a third person. Using the hypothetical of holding ponds again,
the issue is not whether the discharge of waste chemicals into the ponds
was "sudden and accidental", but whether the escape of the chemicals
from the ponds and entry (whether it be deemed a "discharge," "disper-
sal," "release" or "escape") of chemicals into groundwater (owned by
the public) or onto another landowner's property was "sudden and acci-
dental." This is in accord with the intent of the draftsmen of the CGL
policy to provide coverage for the unintended results of intentional
acts. 
84
In Broderick Investment Co. v. The Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co., the court instructed the jury on the pollution exclusion as follows:
The Hartford policies provide that:
This insurance does not apply to property damage arising out of
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials
or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion
does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden
and accidental.
You are instructed that the phrase "discharge, dispersal, release or es-
cape" applies to the entry of the chemicals into the groundwater.
Because the word "sudden" is ambiguous and has more than one
meaning and for other legal reasons, you are instructed that, in this
case, the word "sudden" means unexpected and unforeseen. Thus,
gradual and continuous events can be "sudden" if they were unex-
pected and unforeseen by plaintiff. The word "accidental" means unin-
tended by Broderick.
Thus, in order for this clause to exclude coverage under the policies,
Hartford must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the oc-
currence of the chemicals entering the groundwater was expected or
foreseen by plaintiffs, or that Broderick intended the chemicals to enter
84. See Heinz, Gallozzi, and Gilis, Interpreting the Scope of Coverage for Unexpected Results, 2
ENVri- L.J. 377, 378-79 (1990).
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the groundwater.8 5
C. The Owned Property Exclusion.
This exclusion simply provides that the insurance does not apply to
property damage to property owned, occupied by, rented to, used by, or
in the care, custody or control of the insured.16 Logically, it is an unnec-
essary exclusion, since liability insurance is designed only for third-party
damage in the first place.
The exclusion does not preclude coverage where there is damage to
third-party property such as groundwater or adjoining property.87 The
exclusion does not apply where the policy holder must clean up its own
property to remedy, prevent or mitigate damage or injury to the property
of third parties.8
It is reasonable for the insurer to apportion the damages, but not to
do so on the basis of clean-up of third-party property instead of clean-up
of the insured's property. Instead, the covered damage should include
clean-up of the third-party property plus any part of the clean-up of the
insured's own property which is necessary to prevent continuing contam-
ination or re-contamination of the third-party property. Juries are capa-
ble of determining, based upon expert testimony, which part of the
ultimate clean-up is unrelated to third-party property and should there-
fore be excluded.
D. Timely Notice.
A standard policy "condition" requires written notice of an occur-
rence "as soon as practicable."8 9 It also states that if a claim is made or
suit is brought against the insured, every demand, notice, summons or
other process must be forwarded to the insurer "immediately." 90 Fail-
ure to comply with these conditions bars the claim. Note, an insurer
who asserts that no duty to defend has arisen because no "suit" has been
filed, i.e., that the insurance claim is premature, is in a very poor position
to complain about untimely, notice.
85. Broderick, supra note 54, Jury Instruction No. 15 (emphasis added).
86. See 1 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984).
87. See Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1183 (N.D. Cal.
1988); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
88. Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 528 A.2d 76, 81-2 (N.J. 1987);
Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 371, 373, vacated on other
qrounds, 621 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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It is important to remember, the "occurrence" is the accidental
event which results in property damage or bodily injury. As soon as an
insured learns of property damage potentially caused by an occurrence,
regardless of whether a governmental agency has asserted any type of a
claim, its liability insurers should be notified. However, while insureds
today have a better understanding of the potential for coverage of their
pollution claims and the need for notice to their insurers than they did as
recently as five or ten years ago, it remains fairly common for a large gap
to exist between the date when a company discovers a pollution problem
and the realization by a risk manager or someone else that there may be
insurance coverage.
In some states, such delay in giving notice bars otherwise valid
claims only if the insurer has been prejudiced.9 Since the policyholder
ordinarily responds to potential and actual environmental claims vigor-
ously on its own behalf, prejudice will be hard to show.
In other states, prejudice or lack of prejudice is irrelevant. Untimely
notice is a bar unless the delay is "justifiably excused"; but if there is a
justifiable excuse, even prejudice to the insurer does not bar the claim.92
A typical "justifiable excuse" is that the insured was unaware of the
policy because old policies were not retained. More likely, the insured did
not realize it was even covered. The insured may have been advised by a
broker or agent, its own risk manager, or even by legal counsel that be-
cause of the pollution exclusion or some other reason, there was no cov-
erage. If so, it is up to the jury to decide whether the excuse is justified.
III. PROCEDURAL MATTERS.
A. Discovery.
1. The Sky Isn't the Limit.
A lawyer who represents one of the leading liability carriers in pol-
lution cases was heard to boast that, "a policyholder will never win any
of these cases, because we will make it so expensive for him that he can't
91. See, e-g., Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 140-42, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 693, 696-97 (1970); Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, -, 482 A.2d
503, 505-06 (1984); Found. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Esquibel, 94 N.M. 132, -, 607 P.2d 1150, 1152
(1980). Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 89-1701-CSF (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 1990)
[reported in Mealey's Litigation Reports - Insurance, Feb. 13, 1990, at 9-10]. Accord, Chemical
Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., No. 89-1543 (Magistrate, D.N.J. Jan. 10,
1990)[reported in Mealey's Litigation Reports, Mar. 27, 1990, at 10-11.]
92. See, eg., Marez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 286, 289-90 (Colo. 1981); Colard v. Ameri-
can Family Mutual Ins. Co., 709 P.2d 11, 15 (Col. Ct. App. 1985).
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afford it." Whether true or apocryphal (and at least the conclusion has
been proven wrong), the story underscores a fact well known to policy-
holders who have pursued these claims. Carriers seem ready, willing and
able to squander endless dollars waging litigation: interrogatories upon
depositions upon motions. Although the prospect of an attorney's fee
award to the policyholder may chill the ardor a little,93 policyholders
must spend their money wisely.
The insurer can be expected to spend whatever it takes to try to
prove that the pollution damage was known or expected by the policy-
holder. Production of virtually every record in the insured's history and
depositions of present and former employees, neighbors, etc., are inevita-
ble - and much of it may be legitimate. The lawyer's plan must not be to
prevent this discovery but, instead, to prevent waste.
Waste comes from duplication of effort. Interrogatories should be
answered fully and fairly, but only once - multiple sets by multiple car-
riers must be answered by reference and incorporation. Documents
should be carefully screened for privilege and then produced, but only
once. Witnesses should be freely produced for depositions, but-again-
only once. A good paralegal can handle much of this.
The policyholder's discovery should be specific, narrowly drawn,
and difficult to dodge. The policyholder needs primarily four things: the
policies themselves; information concerning the insurers' knowledge of
the site, such as the inspection reports prepared by investigators or audi-
tors that many liability carriers send to the insured's premises periodi-
cally to inspect for unsafe conditions or practices; representations about
coverage (pro or con) made by the selling agent; and "drafting history"
information. When objections are made to reasonable discovery in these
areas, the lawyer should file a motion to compel early in the proceedings.
This will avoid the obfuscation that otherwise snowballs.
2. Drafting History.
The intent of the draftsmen of the standard policy language can be
gleaned from memoranda, minutes, published articles, speeches,
presentations to insurance commissioners and other documents gener-
ated before changes to the standard forms were adopted. These docu-
ments are in the files of the insurers (particularly those actively involved
in the 1966 and 1973 revisions such as Hartford, Aetna, Travelers, and
Liberty Mutual) and the Insurance Services Office, Inc.
93. See § IV.D. infra.
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Many of the "hot documents," including those referenced in this
outline, have been produced without protective orders. It is common,
however, for insurers to insist on confidential treatment. This provides a
means for waging expensive litigation by objecting, moving for protective
orders, or interpreting requests narrowly in each new case. When chal-
lenged, the demand for confidential treatment has not fared too well. One
magistrate, noting that insurance company information-sharing arrange-
ments contradict the purported need for confidential treatment, and that
sharing of the fruits of discovery from case to case "comes squarely
within the purposes of the Federal Rules," denied the carriers' request
for a protective order covering certain discovery materials. 94
Fortunately, the courts and magistrates are, for the most part, or-
dering production of this information so long as the requests to produce
are reasonably specific in terms of subject matter and time frame.9"
These "adhesion" contracts employ standard policy language which was
adopted only after extensive consideration by insurance industry task
forces and committees. Numerous courts have found drafting history evi-
dence to be relevant to their interpretation of policy terms.96
In a brief filed in Armstrong Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,9
94. Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Casaulty & Sur. Co., No. 89-1701-CSF (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 1990)
[reported in Mealey's Litigation Reports-Insurance, Feb. 13, 1990, at 9-10]. Accord, Chem.
Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 89-1543 (Magistrate, D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1990)
[reported in Mealey's Litigation Reports, Mar. 27, 1990, at 10-11].
95. See, e-g., Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., C.A. No. 88C-JA-118 (Del. Super.
Ct. May 30, 1990) [Mealey's Litigation Reports, June 12, 1990, at 17 (special master)]; Anaconda
Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem. Co., No. C-87-118W (C.D. Utah Feb. 8, 1990) [reported in Mealey's
Litigation Reports - Insurance, Mar. 27, 1990, at 12 (federal judge)]; Leski. Inc. v. Federal Ins.
Co., No. 88-4123 (D.N.J., Nov. 30, 1989) [reported in Mealey's Litigation Reports, Jan. 30, 1990, at
17-18 (magistrate)]; Reichhold Chem. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. CV-88-0351985
(Conn. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 12, 1990) [reported in Mealey's, Jan. 30, 1990, at 18-20) (state judge)];
Champion Int'l Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 88 Civ. 1634 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1989 and Jan 4,
1990) [reported in Mealey's Litigation Reports, Jan. 30, 1990, at 20) (federal judge)]; Boeing Co. v.
Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., No. C86-352D (W.D. Wash. May 11, 1989) [reported in Mealey's
Litigation Reports, Sept. 12, 1989, at Appendix E (special master)]. Two other recent cases to the
same end are Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 87-L-39 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1990), and Mapco Alaska Petroleum, Inc. v. Central National Ins. Co. of Omaha,
No. A89-470 (D. Alaska, fied Feb. 16, 1990) [Mealey's, Litigation Reports, Mar. 27, 1990, at 11 and
12].
96. See, eg., Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 574-75 (1990); Claussen v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333,-, 380 S.E.2d 686, 689-90 (1990); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, -, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (1989); Broad-
well Realty Services, Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 218 N.J. Super. 516, -, 528 A.2d 76,
84-85 (1987); Kipin Indus., Inc. v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 228, -, 535 N.E.2d 334,
338 (1987); see also American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1500
(S.D. N.Y. 1983), mod on other grounds, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984); Coordinated Asbestos Ins.
Coverage Cases, slip op. at 33-35 (May 29, 1987).
97. No. C315367 (Cal. Super. Ct. fied Dec. 21, 1980).
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Travelers Indemnity Company summarized the important role of draft-
ing history evidence in a case where the meaning of insurance policy
terms are in dispute:
Because of the way the insurance industry operates, most of the rele-
vant policy language is found in standardized insuring forms, drafted
by insurance associations or bureaus, and used industry-wide. Thus,
questions of intent may be addressed on a standardized basis. Predict-
ably, there will be precious little evidence of the negotiation of individ-
ual policies. The primary evidence on the intent of the parties drafting
the contracts, and their expectations about scope of coverage, will be
obtained through document productions from key industry-wide orga-nizations, and depositions of personnel. 98
Another well-known example of insurance industry confirmation of
the significance of drafting history documents is found in the brief filed
by Upjohn and the First State Insurance Co. in Upjohn Co. v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co.99
The drafting history shows that the industry, or at least certain in-
surance companies, took different positions on the same language "then"
versus "now." Does this alone constitute "bad faith" in an actionable
sense? If the coverage battles continue into the 1990's, we will likely find
out.
B. Judge or Jury Trial.
Insurance companies favor a three-phased procedural approach to
resolution of these cases based upon the model of Shell Oil Co. v. Acci-
dent & Casualty Insurance Co..1" Indeed, some carriers have invited
trial judges to contact Judge Lanam to "discuss his experiences" and ob-
tain assistance in understanding and duplicating his approach.
The first phase is a "trial" to the court, during which the key policy
terms will be interpreted as a matter of law. Next, if necessary, a jury
trial will resolve fact questions. These include: whether the damage was
expected or intended, whether the pollution was sudden and accidental
(per the judge's definition of these terms from Phase I), and what portion
of the damages exclusively relates to damage to the insured's own prop-
erty. The third phase (if necessary) is a bench "trial" or hearing to the
court to resolve such issues as stacking of coverages, apportionment of
98. Id., Brief for Travelers Indemnity Co. at 7-8.
99. No. 98969 (Mich. Ct. App. fled Nov. 6, 1987).
100. Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Co. of Winterthur, No. 278953 (Cal Super. Ct., San
Mateo, Cal.), verdict rendered Dec. 30, 1988.
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liability among insurers, and whether consulting costs are defense or
indemnity.
Some cynics suggest that the reason for this approach is to isolate
the drafting history evidence from the jury. Only the court, in Phase I,
hears what was intended when the terms were adopted versus what is
being asserted now. In Phase II, the insurers can appear above reproach
by highlighting the pollution and the policyholder's attempt to foist off
on the insurer its responsibility to clean up its own mess, without any
unsavory evidence coming from the other direction. This writer believes
Phase III to be theoretical only, since insureds are unlikely to survive to
that point. Of course, whether there is any truth to such speculation is
known only to those who have advocated the three-phased approach.
In fact, the three-phased approach has much to commend it. Inter-
pretation of the meaning of insurance policy terms is a matter of law. It is
much easier to prepare for a jury trial if the governing law is known.
Mixing drafting history evidence with site-specific fact evidence compli-
cates the trial and potentially could lead to jury boredom if not confu-
sion. It may even be worth considering a similarly phased approach to
discovery, so that the scope of coverage is decided before discovering
facts regarding the policyholder's knowledge and intent.
The procedural problem would, of course, be simpler if no jury were
demanded. However, insurers are demanding jury trials in these cases. It
is unclear whether they are entitled to it. These are declaratory judgment
actions, but that begs the question. One needs to look at the underlying
remedy being sought. The policyholder seeks an order requiring specific
performance of the insurer's duties to defend and indemnify under the
insurance contract. Some courts have declined to allow jury trials on
that basis.101 Other courts have held that where there is a disputed fact
that is relevant to the interpretation of an insurance policy, there is a
right to a jury trial on those questions of fact.102 If that is the case, the
fact question regarding the intent of the draftsman of the standard form
language, if admissible at all, should also be a matter for jury determina-
tion. If it is, it remains unanswered whether there must be a two-phased
jury trial, whereby the jury would first resolve questions of fact material
101. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 145 Iln. App. 3d 175,-, 494
N.E.2d 634, 649 (1986), aff'd sub. nom. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 118 Iln. 2d 23, -,
514 N.E.2d 150, 166 (1987); Keene Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., No. 4454-85 (Super. Ct. D.C.,
Order striking jury demand entered June 22, 1989).
102. See, e.g., Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 1981); Aetna Casu-
alty and Sur. Company of Hartford v. Means, 382 F.2d 26, 28-29 (10th Cir. 1967).
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to determining what the policy terms mean and then decide fact ques-
tions necessary to apply the "law" (policy terms) to the specific facts of
the case.
Although the three-phased approach probably works as well as any,
the policyholder must keep two ideas firmly in mind. Interpretation of
the policy's terms (Phase I) does no more than give him a chance of
ultimate success. That is where the legal scholars and drafting history
experts are helpful. Phase II depends on the skill of the trial lawyer. The
attorney can concentrate on thoughtful and skillful preparation and pres-
entation of the facts concerning such subjects as the history of the policy-
holder's operation, knowledge of pollution and the like, which is where
the case will be won or lost.
IV. POST TRIAL.
A. Stacking of Coverages.
The term "stacking" has been used in a variety of ways by different
courts. In this paper, it means whether, in a situation where more than
one policy is triggered "horizontally" by a continuous occurrence, each
such policy indemnifies the loss up to its policy limits so that the insured
gains the benefit of more than one policy. The courts have taken three
basic approaches.
The oft-cited case of Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North
America1 3 is thought of as a pro-policyholder decision because of its so-
called "triple trigger" (more accurately described as a "continuous trig-
ger") approach to the trigger issue. On the more difficult, and potentially
more important, stacking issue, it represents the most conservative of the
three approaches to this question. The policyholder is allowed to recover
the per-occurrence limits of only one policy. 1°4 The Coordinated Asbes-
tos case followed the Keene approach.105 These courts reasoned that
even though a continuous occurrence may trigger more than one policy,
the limits are defined "per occurrence"; if the policyholder could recover
the "per occurrence" limit on more than one policy, it would get more
than it bargained for."°6 This reasoning is very questionable, because this
approach ordinarily does not result in loss of coverage for asbestos
103. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
104. Id. at 1049.
105. Tentative Decision Concerning Phase IV Issues, no. 1072, slip op. at 69-70 (August 29,
1988).
106. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1049; Coordinated Asbestos, supra note 35, slip op. at 69-70.
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claims. Each claim is relatively small. The coverage part of each policy
provides indemnity for "all sums" which an insured becomes legally obli-
gated to pay. The policyholder contracts, and pays, for this coverage sep-
arately with each successive policy. An insured who purchases several
policies loses the benefit of his bargain on all but the selected one and
ends up with the same coverage as an insured who purchased only one
policy. The insurers whose policies were triggered but not selected may
receive a windfall (subject to apportionment under the "Other Insur-
ance" clause). At least the Keene and Coordinated Asbestos cases permit-
ted the policyholder to select the best year.
A second approach allows the policyholder to recover the per occur-
rence limits of all policies, but with the proviso that each insurer's expo-
sure is to be calculated proportionately, Le., the number of years it
provided coverage divided by the number of years when damage was oc-
curring. 107 This approach allocates to the insured whatever pro rata
share is attributable to uninsured periods or periods where insolvent, un-
identified or settled insurers provided the coverage. Again, this approach
is not suggested by the policy language; each policy provides coverage for
"all sums" which the insured becomes obligated to pay, up to the policy
limits. It is an attempt to apportion the loss in what the courts thought
was an equitable manner. However, the "Other Insurance" clause in the
policy provides for apportionment among insurers in appropriate
circumstances. 10
The third, and preferred, approach is that the policyholder may re-
cover the per occurrence limits of as many of the triggered policies as it
takes to cover the sums which the policyholder is obligated to pay.109
This squares with the "all sums" language and the principle that policies
must be interpreted to maximize coverage. In Dayton, the indemnifica-
tion and defense costs (for asbestos property damage) were within the
scope of the primary and excess policies in effect for any one year. Thus,
the court allowed the insured to choose which policy year to apply. It is
evident from the court's discussion, however, that if the indemnification
107. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1224-1225 (6th Cir.
1980); Ducre v. Mine Safety Appliances, 645 F. Supp. 708, 714 (E.D. La. 1986).
108. Note, while it is clear that the Forty-Etqht court approved of "stacking" on the approach
mentioned, its actual discussion of the "stacking problem" refers to a very different issue, namely,
whether each inhalation of an asbestos fiber was a separate "injury" resulting in potentially infinite
occurrences and liability - an obviously absurd scenario. 633 F.2d at 1226, n. 28.
109. See, eg., Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1410-11
(E.D. Tex. 1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom; W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990).
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and defense costs had been greater than the insurance provided by one
year's policies, then the court would have allowed the insured to recover
under as many policies as necessary to make it whole for its loss."'0
In Broderick Investment Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co.,"' the court adopted the Dayton method and held that unexpected
and unintended property damage which occurred continuously from
1976 through 1983 both "triggered" and made "applicable" all Hartford
policies issued in those years.1 2
B. The Other Insurance Clause.
This clause in the standard primary policy provides, in pertinent
part:
When both this insurance and other insurance apply to the loss on the
same basis, whether primary, excess or contingent, the company shall
not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of the loss than
that stated in the applicable contribution provision below:
(a) Contribution by Equal Shares. If all of such other valid and collecti-
ble insurance provides for contribution by equal shares, the company
shall not be liable for a greater proportion of such loss than would be
payable if each insurer contributes an equal share until the share of
each insurer equals the lowest applicable limit of liability under any
one policy or the full amount of the loss is paid, and with respect to
any amount of loss not so paid, the remaining insurers then continue to
contribute equal shares of the remaining amount of the loss until each
such insurer has paid its limit in full or the full amount of the loss is
paid.
(b) Contribution by Limits. If any of such other insurance does not
provide for contribution by equal shares, the company shall not be lia-
ble for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of
liability under this policy for such loss bears to the total applicable
limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such
loss. 1 13
This clause is a potential "trap for the unwary" in situations where
policies issued by multiple insurers are "triggered" and the insured set-
tles with some and goes to trial against others. For example, suppose the
110. Dayton, supra note 109, at 1411 and n.23. See also Air Products and Chem. Inc. v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co., 707 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (suggesting that the triggered
policies must be applied in chronological order, but seemingly upon exhaustion, the next policy
applies).
111. 742 F. Supp. 571 (D. Colo. 1989).
112. Id. at 573. There is support in the drafting history for stacking as well, such as the Gilbert
Bean speech referenced in § II.B., supra note 64.
113. 1 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984).
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insured settles claims with several carriers whose collective policy limits
are $20 million for a total of $1.5 million. The insured obtains a judg-
ment against the remaining insurer for the full amount of its policy limits
of $5 million. The ultimate damages the insured becomes obligated to
pay total $10 million. Does the insured recover from the non-settling
defendant its full $5 million policy limits, or just $2 million worth? (20%
of the total damages.)
"Other insurance" clauses are designed to prevent double recovery
when more than one insurance company is obligated to respond to a
claim. 14 Thus, they are designed to prevent a windfall on the part of the
insured while fairly apportioning the insured's loss between or among the
carriers. They may not be used as a basis to allocate part of the loss to
the insured. 1
15
In the case of New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co.,116
which addresses ground water contamination originating from a munici-
pal landfill, eleven of twelve insurers settled with the policyholder.117
The court held that the one nonsettling insurer, Continental, could not
use the "Other Insurance" clause to impose liability upon the insured,
because that clause applies only to rights among carriers. 8
In the foregoing hypothetical, the full $5 million should apply.
What if the total cleanup in the hypothetical case were $5 million? The
settlement funds should be the first dollars applied, such that the nonset-
tling carrier pays only $3.5 million and receives the benefit of the "Other
Insurance" clause.' 19
Also, the settling carriers' policies must apply to the loss "on the
same basis" and must be "valid and collectible" insurance before the
"Other Insurance" clause even applies. An appellate court in Louisiana
114. Broderick, 742 F. Supp. 571, 573 (D. Colo. 1989).
115. Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1411, n. 21 (E.D.
Tex. 1988) rev'd on other qrounds sub nom; Air Products and Chem. Inc. v. Hartford Accident and
Indem. Co., 707 F. Supp. 762, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1989); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1990).
116. New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, (D. Del. 1989). See also
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Northbrook Excess and Surplus Ins. Co., 494 N.E.2d 634, 650 (Ill. App. 1986)
("Other Insurance" provisions do not effect the insurer's duty to the insured to provide full defense
and indemnification). But see Cooper Indus. Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. 374 C.D.
1985 (Court of Common Pleas, Mercer County, Pa. 1987) (holding that the insured stepped into the
shoes of the settling carriers and became liable to itself for their pro rata share of the liability for a
CERCLA claim).
117. New Castle County, 725 F. Supp. at 802.
118. Id. at 817.
119. See, eg., Childs v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 723, 727 (N.J. 1987).
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held that other insurance is not valid and collectible until a court so de-
termines in a proceeding to which the other insurer is a party.120 Under
this approach, settling insurers' policies would never be analyzed under
the "Other Insurance" clause. At a minimum, if the settling insurers had
different coverage language, different exclusions, or other differences, this
clause should not apply.
Finally, it has traditionally been held that each insurer whose policy
is "triggered" independently owes a duty to defend which cannot be ap-
portioned. 121 The D.C. Circuit, in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, permitted defense costs to be allocated among the insurers
whose policies were triggered. 122 Another jurisdiction allowed proration
of defense costs among insurers and insureds for uninsured periods.123
Since insurers have traditionally been held liable to defend suits in their
entirety where only one claim arguably is covered, it is hard to under-
stand how any portion of the defense can be allocated to the policy-
holder. The Illinois Supreme Court, noting that Forty-Eight was wrong
in its "exposure" trigger theory, simply refused as a result to consider its
proration theories. 124
C. Consulting Costs.
A "potentially responsible party" responds to an EPA claim by hir-
ing both attorneys and technical consultants. Are the "consultants costs"
part of the "duty to defend," or are they part of the damages covered by
the indemnification obligation under the policy? This can make a signifi-
cant difference to the insured in policies where the duty to defend is not
integrated into the policy limits.
Although this issue has not been extensively litigated, a relevant
case is Arco Industrial Corp. v. Home Indemnity Co. where fees of con-
suiting firms were deemed defense costs to the extent they related to
"general investigative consulting work to aid Arco in defending the un-
derlying litigation," or advice relating to the conduct of the defense.121
Since one of the purposes for a policyholder's consenting to conduct
120. Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 195 So.2d 390, 399 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
121. See, eg., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579, 582 (10th
Cir. 1960); Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Indus., 514 N.E.2d 150, 165 (Ill. 1987).
122. 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 n. 37 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
123. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1980)
(by years of coverage).
124. Zurich, supra note 121, 514 N.E.2d at 165.
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the investigation and clean-up in the first place is to keep some control of
the costs, it is reasonable to view all of the consultants' work as part of
the defense effort. A reasonable compromise approach is to recognize
that the consultants perform two functions. One is to take and analyze
samples and write up reports. Another is to assist the PRP, and PRP's
counsel, in conceiving, negotiating and implementing a program of inves-
tigation and clean-up that is not only environmentally but also economi-
cally sound, i.e., minimizing the costs. This is similar to the traditional
use of experts to defend liability claims. Insureds should be advised to
have their consultants divide billings into the two categories from the
outset.
D. Attorneys' Fees.
The infamous case of Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Co. of
Winterthur26 in California apparently set new records for litigation ex-
pense. It has been rumored that Shell spent over $50 million, and the
insurers spent multiples of that. While this was obviously an extraordi-
nary case, the fact remains that declaratory judgment litigation in this
complex area can be very expensive. PRP's are faced with two problems:
1) they must defend themselves against the underlying EPA claim, which
consumes vast quantities of money; 2) they simultaneously pay lawyers
to chase after insurance coverage that may not turn out to exist. Even if
it does, their funds will be greatly depleted by the effort.
Fortunately, some states, such as Colorado and Kansas, have recog-
nized that, where an insured prevails in a declaratory judgment suit, it
should receive an award of attorneys' fees.127 As a policy matter, if an
insured has to pay vast sums to establish what he had all along, he has
lost the benefit of his insurance contract in the process. Further, standard
liability insurance contract language requires the insurer to reimburse the
insured for all reasonable expenses incurred during litigation at the re-
quest of the insurer. This requirement can be interpreted to include at-
torneys' fees for declaratory judgment suits - whether started by the
insurer or the insured. Because the insurers have won most of the pollu-
tion cases, the issue has only once arisen in that context. In Broderick,
the court held that the prevailing policyholder was entitled to reasonable
126. No. 278953 (Cal. Super. CL, San Mateo, Cal., verdict rendered Dec. 30, 1988).
127. Hedgecock v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 676 P.2d 1208 (Colo. App. 1983); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Robins, 597 P.2d 1052 (Colo. App. 1979); Upland Mut. Ins. v. Noel, 519 P.2d 737 (Kan. 1974).
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attorneys' fees in an amount to be determined. This holding was based in
part on the contractual language obligating the insurer to pay
reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at the company's request
in assisting the company in the investigation or defense of any claim or
suit .... 128
It was also based on the conclusion that "granting attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs will restore the insured to the position they would have occu-
pied had the defendant honored its contracts of insurance." 129
V. LOOKING AHEAD.
Environmental claims are frightening to insurers. It is reasonably
clear that when policies were sold in the 1940's, 1950's, 1960's and even
the 1970's and early 1980's, the enormity and expense of pollution-re-
lated claims was unanticipated - by either side. The costs of defending
against these claims, and more significantly the types of clean-up costs
incurred, are so enormous as to threaten the profitability and, in some
instances, the existence of carriers which sold the insurance. They also
threaten the existence of many insureds. This common threat should be
the basis for a partnership to solve the problem.
This author has offered his own thoughts and proposals from the
policyholder's perspective. 130 Insurance industry representatives have
also stepped forward with proposals for resolving the allocation of the
costs of pollution remedies on a non-litigation basis. 131
The Committee on Insurance Coverage Litigation of the American
Bar Association's Litigation Section discussed the creation of a biparti-
san task force to explore the problem at its mid-year meeting, April 5-7,
1990. Plainly, a protocol or understanding between insurers and policy-
holders regarding the interpretation and application of the policies would
re-route both sides' dollars from litigation to clean-up and be a marvel-
ous achievement. We can hope this isn't merely a pipe dream.
It is submitted that most insureds are not looking to foist their
problems off onto their insurers. What they are looking for is help -
128. 1 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:72 (2d ed. 1984).
129. Broderick, No. 86-Z-1033 (D. Colo.) at 3-4.
130. Jackson, Environmental Cleanups and Insurance: Isn't There a Better Way?, 21 ENVTL.
REP. (BNA) 767 (1990).
131. See, eg., Cheek, Insurance Coveraqe for Superfund Liability Defense and Clean-up Costs:
The Need for a Non-Litiagtion Approach, 19 ENVTL. L.REP. 10203 (1989); Bradford, Insurer Advo.
cates No-Fault Cleanup Fund, BusINss INSURANCE, Oct. 2, 1989, at 17; Shalowitz, Insurer'r Propo-
sal Could Cut EIL Costs, BUSINESS INSURANCE, Feb. 29, 1988, at 1.
(Vol. 26:209
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some relief in the form of cost-sharing to help them cope with the cost of
responding to enormously expensive claims. Something more sensible
than litigation must exist. If it doesn't, then insurers and insureds will
continue to litigate these outrageously costly games of "chicken," and
ultimately the environment and the public will lose.
If "business as usual" prevails, we may see fifty different approaches
as the cases reach the various state supreme courts. The standard CGL
form simply is not clear or conclusive on several key issues. Courts strug-
gling with these cases should be guided by the basic maxim of insurance
policy construction that where there is any question or ambiguity con-
cerning interpretation of a term in an insurance policy, or how different
terms fit together, the contract should be interpreted to fulfill the funda-
mental purpose of indemnification. 132
Insurance policy language should not be tortured to provide cover-
age; insurers are entitled to the benefit of their bargain, just like any other
party to a contract. However, these are contracts of adhesion, in the na-
ture of private legislation, prepared by the Insurance Services Office or
other trade associations. They are based upon extensive study and input
from the insurance industry. If ambiguities exist, either due to poor
draftsmanship or market factors, they should be construed to maximize
coverage.
But, again, this is a litigation wasteland. Even without a "global set-
tlement," insureds and insurers ought to be able to sit down, on an indi-
vidual case-by-case basis, and work out a cost-sharing approach to the
defense against, or response to, the EPA claims. In terms of clean-up,
insureds and insurers should cooperate in trying to develop, and finance,
a sound and cost-effective program. Ideally, the EPA should be a partici-
pant in these discussions. Reasonable minds can conceive a scenario
where the EPA agrees to an investigation program which does not pile
study upon study and a clean-up which is not hideously expensive. The
EPA, using Superfund dollars, could assist the insured and the insurer in
reaching an agreement on a cost-sharing approach. Creative ideas, such
as the type of structured settlements typically used in personal injury
cases, might successfully be employed to accomplish these objectives.
This doesn't seem too much to hope for.
132. See, e.g., Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1989)
(pollution property damage and bodily injury); Air Products and Chemicals., Inc. v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 707 F. Supp. 762, 770 (E.D. Pa.1989)(asbestos and welding fume personal in-




Jackson: Liability Insurance for Pollution Claims: Avoiding A Litigation W
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1990
36
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol26/iss2/3
